at Metaphysical Mayhem 2023
My research currently has three main threads.
Epistemology: I am interested in empirical evidence and epistemic normativity. What is the foundational relationship that justifies empirical beliefs? What are the conditions of epistemic justification in general?
Decision Theory: I am interested in theories of rational choice that are normative and substantive. Causal Decision Theory is the received theory that fits these criteria, but it faces challenges. How serious are these challenges? How do other theories of decision stack up?
Action: I am interested in the nature of action. What marks the difference between mere action and intentional action? Some of our actions merit praise and blame. What are the conditions that make praise or blame fitting? Can non-human animals meet these conditions?
PUBLICATIONS
Synopsis: I develop an anti-luck condition for intentional action that depends on an agent's discriminative capacities rather than reliable success.
Synopsis: A hybridization of Newcomb's Problem and the Frustrater causes trouble for those who support two-boxing in Newcomb's Problem and envelope-taking in the Frustrater.
Synopsis: One objection to Juan Comesaña's account of epistemic justification claims it is committed to saying that certain reflective agents are required to form a doublethink attitude toward their future evidence. I argue that standard forms of fallibilist foundationalism have a similar commitment.
Synopsis: Some philosophers think evidence can be unspecific. If so, then some alleged counterexamples to causal decision theory fail. This shows that theories of evidence and decision can be intertwined.
Synopsis: A reasons-responsive account of moral responsibility implies that non-human animals can be praiseworthy. This implication should be accepted.
Winner of the Philosophy of Animal Minds and Behavior Association Essay Prize for Emerging Scholars.
Aliya and I discussed this paper on the podcast Knowing Animals here.
Knowledge from Blindspots (with Juan Comesaña and Timothy Kearl), 2023, Illuminating Errors: New Essays on Knowledge from Non-Knowledge.
Synopsis: You can know P even if P was inferred from a blindspot proposition.
Synopsis: A parity between epistemic and moral normativity is a challenge for moral error theorists. They have responded to this challenge in three different ways. All three have problems.
IN PROGRESS
The following projects are at a stage where I would be happy to share a draft.
A paper discussing the possibility of justified belief in skeptical scenarios.
A paper discussing Cartesianism and luminosity.
A paper on foundationalism and empirical evidence.
A paper on evidence possession and epistemic justification.
A paper on binding and two-boxing.
NOT IN PROGRESS
The following are projects that I currently do not intend to publish or pursue further. However, I think they contain ideas that are interesting enough to share.
Synopsis: A theory of decision that combines elements of Causal Decision Theory and Evidential Decision Theory fares well in light of alleged counterexamples to both theories.
A Fair Shake for Fragmentalism
Synopsis: Puzzles in the conceptual foundations of physics suggest that reality is fundamentally fragmented.
