My research currently has three main threads.
Epistemology: I am interested in empirical evidence and epistemic normativity. What is the foundational relationship that justifies empirical beliefs? What are the conditions of epistemic justification in general?
Decision Theory: I am interested in theories of rational choice that are normative and substantive. Causal Decision Theory is the received theory that fits these criteria, but it faces challenges. How serious are these challenges? How do other theories of decision stack up?
Action: I am interested in the nature of action. What marks the difference between mere action and intentional action? Some of our actions merit praise and blame. What are the conditions that make praise or blame fitting? Can non-human animals meet these conditions?
Synopsis: One objection to Juan Comesaña's account of epistemic justification claims it is committed to saying that certain reflective agents are required to form a doublethink attitude toward their future evidence. I argue that standard forms of fallibilist foundationalism have a similar commitment.
Synopsis: Some philosophers think evidence can be unspecific. If so, then an alleged counterexamples to causal decision theory fail. This shows that theories of evidence and decision can be intertwined.
Synopsis: A reasons-responsive account of moral responsibility implies that non-human animals can be praiseworthy. This implication should be accepted.
Aliya and I discussed this paper on the podcast Knowing Animals here.
Synopsis: A parity between epistemic and moral normativity is a challenge for moral error theorists. They have responded to this challenge in three different ways. All three have problems.
WORKS IN PROGRESS
The following are papers that are at a stage where I would (probably) be happy to send you a draft.
A paper on the connection between reliable success and intentional action.
A paper discussing the possibility of justified belief in skeptical scenarios.
A paper discussing the possibility of rational change in epistemic standards.
A paper defending Fine's fragmentalism via contemporary puzzles in the philosophy of physics.
PROJECTS IN PROGRESS
The following are projects that are not at the draft-sharing stage, but they are projects I am happy to discuss.
A paper on moral agency in non-human animals.
A paper on Cartesianism and luminosity.
A paper discussing arguments against epistemic internalism by appealing to moral considerations.
A paper discussing path (in)dependence in epistemic justification.
A paper on the connection between trust and knowledge.